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The problem of conflict of laws 1 among workmen's
compensation statutes is a peculiarly appropriate one for
Federal concern. Whatever questions may be raised about
Federal involvement in State workmen's compensation
standards and performance in view of the tradition that
workmen's compensation is a State matter, it is difficult
to see how anyone could object to an overall nationwide
approach to the conflicts problem. The reason is
self-evident. No single State, acting by itself, can arrive at
a satisfactory disposition of the matter. The essence of the
conflicts problem is that, by definition, it potentially
involves more than one State. A definitive solution,
therefore, necessarily involves coordination between all
the States.
I. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The reason that conflict of laws is such a conspicuous
problem in workmen's compensation is, of course, that
under modern conditions of employment, the employees
of a single employer may work in many States, often
moving from State to State or even out of the country,
and may frequently be permanently stationed outside of
the employer's home State. One has only to think of such
businesses as airlines, trucking lines, bus lines, 2 large
construction companies, and companies of all kinds
utilizing branch offices and traveling salesmen or
solicitors, not to mention the staffs of large publications,
traveling shows, and the like, to realize that
"out-of-State" injuries, far from being unusual, are
everyday occurrences. The second element making
conflicts a crucial matter is the extreme disparity among
the benefits available in different States.
A potential conflicts problem may arise, not only
between two States, but among three or four, and
possibly among even five or six. In the McMains case,3 for
example, the residence of the employer was in
Connecticut, the contract was made in Kansas, the place
of employment was Kennedy Airport in New York, the
place to which the pilot was assigned was Hamburg,
Germany, and the place of injury was Brazil. In another
almost textbook example of the problem, the Daniels
case, 4 the claimant's residence was in Illinois, the contract
was made in Texas, the home office of the employer was
in Michigan, whose law the contract also purported to
make applicable, and the accident occurred in Tennessee.
5
The crucial importance of the conflicts question is seen in
the fact that if the claimant was limited to a Tennessee
recovery, the most that he could have received for a
permanent total injury under current rates would have
been $18,800, while in Michigan, with dependents and a
long period of survival, it is conceivable he might have
received as much as $400,000. Similarly, as to medical
benefits, in Tennessee he would have been limited to a
basic $3,500, plus a possible $5,000 extension, whereas in
Michigan his medical benefits would have been unlimited.
II. PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW
Since the various State compensation statutes,
together with whatever conflicts provisions they may
contain, have been arrived at independently by State
legislatures and have been interpreted independently by
State courts, it is perhaps not surprising that the present
status of the law is characterized by an almost complete
lack of coordination. There are fifty State statutes, some
of which contain no provision at all on the conflicts
question, and the rest of which display various mixtures
of such ingredients as place of contract, place of
employment, place of employee's residence, place of
employer's business, and several others. Even when the
conflicts provisions of two States appear similar, which is
rare, the similarity may have been destroyed by judicial
decisions, some of which have the aspect of outright
amendments to the statutes.
The classical illustration of the kind of tragic
miscarriage of justice produced by the failure of the gears
to mesh between State compensation acts is House v.
Industrial Commission.6 The deceased had made a
contract in Oregon and was then immediately sent to
California as a branch manager. Later he was called back
to attend a brief branch managers' meeting in Oregon,
during which time he was killed. His widow was denied
workmen's compensation benefits in both Oregon and
California because at this time California required the
place of contract to be within its boundaries before it
would cover an out-of-State injury, and because Oregon
required the place of regular employment to be there
before it would cover even an in-State injury. 7
How often this kind of inexcusable result occurs in
actual practice would be impossible to say without an
actual field study. On paper, at least, it would appear that
there are numerous opportunities for this sort of "falling
between two stools" to occur. In Bank v. Meyers, 8
although both the injury and the contract were within the
State, Maryland denied compensation because the
employer's place of business was not within the State, and
this condition was a basic requisite for application of the
Maryland statute.
The mathematical probability of such miscarriages
increases sharply as the number of components required
to be within the State increases. For example, Virginia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina require, before they
will accord coverage to an out-of-State injury, that the
place of contract be in the State, the place of the
employer's business be in the State, and the employee's
residence be in the State. Now suppose that the contract
were made in Virginia and the place of the employer's
business was in Virginia, but the employee's residence was
in North Carolina, as could easily happen along the
common boundary of these two States. Then suppose that
the employee suffered an accident while temporarily in
Ohio. On the face of their statutes, neither Virginia nor
North Carolina would seem to cover the injury. Ohio by
statute does not cover temporary visitors if they are
"insured" in another State; consequently, there might be
some question on coverage by Ohio since, in a sense, the
employee was insured elsewhere. For a clearer example of
non-coverage, one could go back to the situation in New
York under Wesotsky v. Storch9 prior to the decision in
the Rutledge-Rhodes cases.10 During that period, as a
result of a judicial decision, New York definitely did not
cover temporary visitors under any circumstances. Thus,
the problem could have arisen on any temporary visit to
New York by any employee who had in any way divided
the requisite elements between Virginia, North Carolina,
or South Carolina.
III. TIMELINESS OF REFORM EFFORT
Past efforts to work out some kind of overall solution
to the conflicts problem have invariably failed, but there
is every reason to believe that various changes in
conditions have brought us to the point where successful
action is now possible. The American Bar Association, for
example, had a special committee that worked on this
matter for several years and finally gave up. Since that
time, there have been significant changes in attitudes on
conflicts and in theories of what the real objectives of
conflicts rules are.
The most significant and pervasive change is that
conflicts law generally has moved from an era of
conceptualism to an era of pragm itism, with workmen's
compensation law cases providing the leading landmarks
at many points.
The period of conceptualism is often identified with
the great conflicts scholar Beale and with the first
Restatement of the Law on conflict of laws, which was
dominated by "Bealean" theories. At that time, there was
a pervasive urge to arrive at a logical pattern under which
one could say of a particular case: "This State's law
applies, and no other's." Among the objectives of such a
system, practical considerations were almost completely
absent. What counted was esthetics, symmetry, and logic.
The ideal solution was a pattern with all the edges meeting
neatly, with no overlaps, no inconsistencies, no gaps, and
no uncertainties.
Then began a process of eroding the conceptual
approach and replacing it with the pragmatic approach
based on "valid State interests." There is no occasion to
rehearse here this long constitutional story. One may
simply summarize it by saying that it began with Bradford
v. Clapper, 1 1 in which the Supreme Court had held that
New Hampshire could not apply its compensation law to a
decedent killed while on temporary duty in New
Hampshire, when all of the other features of the
employment were within Vermont, since this would
violate New Hampshire's duty to give full faith and credit
to the laws of Vermont. This decision was soon followed,
however, by a series of Supreme Court decisions that
ended by firmly establishing the rule that any State having
a legitimate interest in the episode could apply its
compensation law without offending the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 12
The principal reason, then, why a present effort could
succeed where earlier efforts have failed is that it is now
possible to be clear about the real objectives of conflicts
law. Earlier efforts were confused by inability to decide
upon or agree upon the extent to which conflicts laws
should attempt to satisfy such objectives as symmetry,
consistency, logic, esthetics, and constitutional
orthodoxy. The present effort can put all these
considerations to one side, and concentrate solely on the
practical question of what kind of conflicts arrangement
will best carry out those objectives which the workmen's
compensation system has been created to serve.
This change in the underpinnings of the
constitutional structure is matched by corresponding
changes in the opportunities for freedom of action in the
statutory and decisional realms. Most of the existing
statutory provisions, and most of the early judicial
decisions either creating conflicts rules or interpreting
statutory rules, reflected the conceptual approach of the
earlier period. One school of thought proceeded on the
theory that workmen's compensation was essentially a
branch of tort law, and therefore the tort theory of lex
loci delicti, making the place of injury the controlling
factory, should apply. The principal competitor of this
theory, which soon became the dominant view, was the
contract theory. This approach was based on the idea that
compensation statutes become a part of the employment
contract since, in this view, the right to workmen's
compensation was an incident of the contractual
employment relation. It followed that the place where the
contract was made became the dominant factor. Both of
these underlying theories are now largely discredited, but
the conflicts rules that were derived from them,
particularly from the contract theory, have become
embedded in many statutes and a few decisions. The third
principal theory was that workmen's compensation dealt
with the "employment relationship" and that therefore
the place of that relationship should be the place where
the statute applied. This theory made more sense and was
a much less artificial idea, but its defect was that the
"place of employment relation" had a sort of mystical
quality that was difficult to tie down to a particular
physical area. As to the first two theories, one was always
quite sure where the injury took place and usually but not
always could decide where the contract was made simply
by applying straight contract law, but the idea of an
entity called the "employment relation," involving as it
did two different people, was somewhat more elusive.
IV. THE REAL OBJECTIVES OF COMPENSA-
TION CONFLICTS REFORM
If we can now proceed on the assurance that the time
is ripe to approach the conflicts problem on a purely
pragmatic basis, the starting point is to determine what
the real objectives ought to be as to the employee, the
employer, and the insurance carrier.
As to the employee, the prime objective is the
avoidance of any lacunae in coverage of the sort illus-
trated by the House case and still very possible under
many combinations of existing statutes. Fortunately this
objective, which is by far the most important in principle,
is also the easiest for which to frame a solution, as will be
shown below.
So far as the employer is concerned, the main
objective should be to avoid unreasonably prejudicing him
by requiring him to cover an unexpected injury with no
opportunity to insure against that liability in advance.
Working out this aspect may take a little more compli-
cated planning, but it can be done.
As to the insurer, the main objective is to avoid the
possibility of his being saddled with a compensation
liability without the chance to collect premiums on the
particular risk.
Finally, as to all three, there is the overriding
objective of reducing delay, uncertainty, and litigation by
making the rules, as far as possible, so clear that resort to
courts will not be necessary. One has only to look at the
reported appellate cases to get an idea of the decades of
uncertainty, of protracted litigation, of reversals, of
appeals, and of enormous expense to everyone concerned,
that have been the product of past conflicts confusion. In
New York, for example, the rules have undergone
constant modification and in some points virtual re-
versal. 13 Texas has experienced a veritable flood of cases.
Minnesota has fairly recently in effect reversed its rule,
which made the location of the employer's place of
business dominant if not decisive. The story of the gradual
reversal of Bradford v. Clapper by the United States
Supreme Court has already been mentioned. These appel-
late cases are, of course, only the tip of the iceberg. One
can only imagine what must have been going on all this
time below the appellate level and, for that matter, what
is still going on in various States today as the courts
attempt to bring conflicts law into line with modern
concepts with very little help from the legislatures.
V. MEASURES TO IMPROVE
COMPENSATION CONFLICTS LAW
As to the Employee
To meet the objective of avoiding lacunae in cover-
age, there are two relatively forthright solutions, either
one of which would ordinarily insure that some State
would provide coverage, and the combination of which
would be a completely reliable guarantee of this result.
The first measure would simply be to have every
State provide that it will always apply its compensation
act to any injury occurring within its borders. One salient
advantage of this measure is that, of all the elements that
figure in conflicts law, this one is the easiest to demon-
strate factually. With extremely rare exceptions, the place
where the injury occurred is a simple, demonstrable,
physical fact. Determining where a contract is made, by
contrast, can give rise to complex questions of law and
fact, as when a somewhat tentative agreement is made on
the phone between two States, perhaps even involving a
hiring hall or employment agency.
Moreover, in the spirit of a modern emphasis on valid
State interest, it is clear that the interests of the State of
injury are strong. The medical and hospital bills are
probably owed to persons within the State; the witnesses
to the injury are quite probably in the State, as are other
forms of evidence; and finally, the State's safety laws may
be involved in the accident. Above all, failure to provide
suitable protection may mean that the State of injury will
have on its hands a destitute and disabled man that may
place a burden on the welfare resources of the State. It is
interesting that New York has finally come around to this
position in the Rutledge case, which in effect reverses
Wesotsky. 14
The second measure would be to have each State, in
its extra-territoriality clause, make its coverage of out-of-
State injuries apply to each of the major items of
legitimate State interest in disjunctive rather than con-
junctive terms. For example, the statute could provide
that it applies to an out-of-State injury if the place of
contract was in the State, or the employment was
localized in the State, or the employee's residence was in
the State, or the employer's principal place of business
was in the State. It would not be absolutely necessary to
list all four of these components; the essential feature is to
connect them by "or" rather than by "and," so as to
avoid the kind of problem identified above as flowing
from the Virginia and Carolina type of provision. 15
By this combination, there will always be one State
clearly covering an injury, and almost always two when
any out-of-State feature is present. Such an arrangement
would serve a second possible objective so far as the
injured employee is concerned, and that is to offset the
inherent disadvantage in the matter of making an in-
formed and most advantageous choice when more than
one compensation act may be applicable to his injury.
Under McCartin,16 the rule was established that there is
no constitutional impediment to a second award under
the laws of a second State when both State laws can
validly apply. The amount paid under the statute of the
first State is, of course, deducted from the recovery in the
second State. Apart from the constitutional issue, the
practical consideration at work here is undoubtedly the
conviction that an injured employee cannot always be
expected to make the most favorable chotce among State
statutes potentially applicable to his claim, particularly in
the light of the highly complex and shifting character of
conflicts law. The decision does contain the reservation
that it would not apply if the law of the first State
contained an explicit provision forbidding the seeking of
additional or alternative relief under the laws of another
State. With one exception, all subsequent decisions have
held that the kind of typical exclusive-remedy clauses
found in compensation acts do not come within this
exception to McCartin. The one out-of-line case is Gasch
v. Britton.17 Although this is a very badly reasoned
decision, the fact that one fairly important court could
reach this conclusion confirms the desirability of having
an explicit provision in the statute stating that an award in
another State is not affected by an award in the first State
except for reduction of the amounts paid or awarded in
the other State.
From the point of view of the employer and insurer,
it could be validly argued that this successive-award
principle is undesirable as leaving open the possibility of
repetitious claims based on the same injury. However, the
comparison here is between a substantive right and a
procedural inconvenience. As to the substantive right, the
effect is to give the employee what at least one jurisdic-
tion has determined he is entitled to, while the worst that
can happen to the employer and carrier is that they end
up by paying no more than they would have paid had the
employee made the wisest choice in the first place.
As to the Employer
There are two measures that could be applied to
avoid the possibility that an employer, who has conscien-
tiously taken out insurance in the State or States where he
thought he might become liable, unexpectly finds himself
defending a claim under some other act. The danger is
that he might find himself treated as a non-insured
employer, and thus bring down upon himself various
penalties as well as common law liability without common
law defenses.
The simplest solution would be a universal provision
in all acts that all insurance policies covering any
workmen's compensation liability shall be deemed to
cover the liabilities of the employer under all acts, in all
places, and for all his operations, and that any attempts to
limit this comprehensive liability are void. There is
nothing particularly drastic about this, since this result has
already been arrived at judicially under some "full-
coverage" statutes.
A second solution would be that worked out by the
Council of State Governments, which provides that the
employer who is insured in one State, but unexpectedly
has a claim under another State's act, can file a certificate
showing that he is insured in the one State, and thereby
be relieved of any penalties for non-insurance.
As to the Insurer
To protect the insurer from liability for higher
benefits than those insured against, the insurer could be
made liable only to the extent of the benefit level in the
State under whose act premiums were collected. The
employer would be liable for the excess as a self-insurer.
For this excess he could be required to post security on
the same basis as other self-insurers.
Since the Council of State Governments worked out
its somewhat complicated solution on this problem, there
has been considerable expansion of the use of devices to
minimize their necessity. For instance, the use of "all
States coverage" provisions, whether or not compelled by
statute, permits the employer and carrier to deal in
advance with the kind of problems here discussed. At least
as to the national carriers, the insurance principle is broad
enough to spread the loss in such cases when considered
on a long-term, nationwide basis.
VI. LONGSHOREMEN'S CONFLICTS
We may now briefly consider, in addition to the
conflicts problems between State acts, the distinctive
conflicts problem involving three Federal acts that deal
with industrial injuries: the Longshoremen's Act, the
Jones Act for seamen, and the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (F.E.L.A.) for interstate railway workers. Of
these three, the only true compensation act is the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
There is a remarkable parallel between the constitu-
tional story in this area and that in the area of
State-versus-State conflicts. In the early days of work-
men's compensation, the States applied their acts to
waterfront workers with no worries about constitutional
limitations. Then came the unfortunate Jensen case in
1917.18 This case held that a State workmen's compensa-
tion act could not constitutionally be applied to a
longshoreman working on board a ship unloading cargo,
when the ship was on navigable waters and the longshore-
man was working under a maritime contract. The theory
was that the application of State acts in the circumstances
would impair the uniformity of maritime law. Jensen was
to Longshoremen's conflicts what Bradford was to State
conflicts. The story since Jensen, like the story since
Bradford, has been one long Supreme Court retreat from
this rigid and conceptual constitutional position. Without
tracing this tedious story, one may outline several
clear-cut rules now placed beyond the reach of contro-
versy by the Supreme Court:
1) The Longshoremen's Act always covers all injuries
on navigable waters. 19
2) The Longshoremen's Act never covers any injuries
not on navigable waters. 20
3) State acts always can, and usually do, cover all
injuries on land.
4) Whatever the constitutional theory may be, State
acts, in practice, have also been covering practi-
cally all waterfront injuries, including those on
navigable waters.
This last item needs a bit of explanation. The present
position has come about, not by any clean-cut application
of constitutional principles, but by the operation of the
"twilight zone doctrine." One might almost say that it is a
case of a procedural rule producing a substantive result
that otherwise would be difficult to account for. The
procedural factor is that the United States Supreme Court
simply will not review cases in this area, with the result
that if a State makes an affirmative compensation award
on a particular set of facts, and if in another case an award
is made under the Longshoremen's Act on identical facts,
both cases will stand side by side on the theory that they
are within the twilight zone and will therefore not be
reversed. The position can be summed up by saying that
in the last 40 years, the Supreme Court has never actually
struck down a State award for an injury occurring upon
navigable waters.
In the four-part pattern noted above, everything fits
neatly into place except the fourth item. The kind of
mind that is disturbed by lack of consistency and
symmetry might well wish to restore the neatness of the
pattern by saying that State acts should never apply to
injuries on navigable waters. However, if one puts aside
the claims of esthetics and again concentrates on practical
considerations, the better view seems to be that the
present situation might as well be left alone. If we resort
once more to the "State-interest" approach, we see that a
State does indeed have a valid interest in providing
perhaps even better benefits than those under the Long-
shoremen's Act for those of its residents who work on the
waterfront but who probably live within the State.
Considering that a longshoreman unloading a ship
walks in and out of the Longshoremen's Act every time he
crosses the gangplank, it makes little sense to say that
some sacred principle of maritime uniformity would be
shattered if the State were allowed to apply to him its
own policies on what benefits should be paid, whether he
happens to be on one side or the other of the gangplank.
Moreover, the suggested continuation of this present rule
avoids any chance of a gap of coverage between Long-
shoremen's and State acts, as might conceivably occur in
close cases.
The conclusion, then, is that no particular changes
should be recommended as to the relation of the
Longshoremen's Act to State acts.
VII. JONES ACT CONFLICTS
The Jones Act is an act which provides for "seamen"
the same type of remedies that the F.E.L.A. provides for
railway workers. Here again, on the whole it seems best
not to attempt to change the situation by any kind of
State or Federal legislation.
When the conflict is between the Jones Act and the
Longshoremen's Act, the line is already very sharply
drawn, as sharply as legislative language can make it. If the
claimant is a master or member of the crew of a vessel, the
Longshoremen's Act does not apply. A great deal of case
law has grown up around this dividing line, but since the
case law is already there, there is probably no point in
attempting to codify it and thus set off another round of
interpreting new statutory language.
When the conflict issue arises between the Jones Act
and State compensation acts, there are some problems
developing that promise to keep the courts busy for some
time, but even here it is very difficult to see how any
legislative intervention could help the situation much. The
principal problem I have in mind is the gradual extension
of the Jones Act to shore-based workers on dredges and
the like. The reason there is somewhat of a problem is
that the special features of the Jones Act and its
interpreting cases were worked out fairly much with a
mental picture of the typical seaman, who, because of the
somewhat unnatural conditions of his "cooped up"
existence aboard ship and his exposure to the perils of
exotic faraway places, was thought to need special
solicitude. We are now finding these same special rules
being urged for the benefit of workers who live in the
suburbs of Portland and happen to spend their days
working on a dredge or floating pile driver. The reach of
the Jones Act has been expanded in two principal ways:
the concept of "seaman" has been greatly expanded, and
at the same time there has been a tremendous extension
of the range of on-shore injuries brought within the act.
These trends came to a sort of climax in the Williamson
case, 21 in which it was held that a shore-based worker
who worked during the day on a dredge was within the
Jones Act while riding in a co-worker's car on his way to
work. This case is probably not as remarkable as the
deciding judge evidently thought it was, since the same
result would be reached under State law for resident
employees, traveling employees, and various other
workers whose positions are essentially the same as that of
seamen. Moreover, since the transportation was furnished
by the employer, the case would fit easily within the
majority workmen's compensation rule, which is that the
going and coming trip is covered if it is furnished or paid
for by the employer.
It should never be forgotten, however, that what
appears to be a liberal holding when the affirmative
availability of Jones Act remedies is involved may be a
correspondingly illiberal result if, on the facts, the only
remedy open to the worker would be a State workmen's
compensation grant. The situation here is a little different
from that under the Longshoremen's Act, since it begins
with a doctrine of preemption of the field by the Federal
act, whereas the Longshoremen's Act specifically ex-
cluded from its coverage areas in which compensation
"may" be provided by State law - an exception which
was interpreted out of existence in the Calbeck case. Even
so, there is a kind of de facto twilight zone even between
the Jones Act and State compensation acts which some-
what softens the edges of this preemption rule.
On balance, it would probably be better to leave the
whole area alone, even though there are a lot of things
about it that one would perhaps like to tidy up. Any
amount of tinkering with the present situation might raise
more problems than it would solve.
VIII. F.E.L.A.
At one time there was quite a lot of litigation about
drawing the line between the F.E.L.A. and State work-
men's compensation acts. This controversy has practically
disappeared from sight. For all practical purposes, the act
now applies to all workers employed by interstate
railroads. No doubt one could recommend that the statute
be amended to say so plainly, instead of being limited to
workers whose activities "affect" interstate commerce. In
other words, Congress could restore the language of the
original Act of 1906, which was held unconstitutional. In
view of the much more permissive standards of constitu-
tional law today, it seems quite evident that such an act
would now be held constitutional.
However, it may be questioned whether such an
amendment would really change anything since the
decisions of the courts, including the Supreme Court of
the United States, have expanded the concept of "af-
fecting" interstate commerce to the point where every-
body seems to assume that all interstate railway em-
ployees are within the act. The two cases that seem to
have put an abrupt end to the prolific flood of contro-
versies about "affecting" interstate commerce were Reed
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company22 and its companion
case, Southern Pacific Company v. Gileo.2 3 In Reed it
was held that a woman filing tracings from which
someone else would make blueprints from which someone
else would make repairs was engaged in activity affecting
interstate commerce. In Gileo it was held, contrary to
earlier assumptions, that a man working on the construc-
tion of new railway cars was covered. Since clerical
workers and workers on new car construction were two of
the categories that previously had been thought most
unlikely to be covered by the Act, it is perhaps not
surprising that since these two cases there has not been a
single case in the Supreme Court involving this boundary
line between the F.E.L.A. and State acts.
Assuming, then, that the issue is whether the existing
F.E.L.A. should be equipped with a more specific
provision delineating where it leaves off and where State
compensation acts take over, the conclusion would be
that such an amendment would accomplish virtually
nothing. Of course, there are other much more radical
moves that are at least theoretically possible. One would
be to restore the entire coverage of railway workers to the
States, putting them in the same position as workers on
bus lines or airlines. The other would be to pass a true
workmen's compensation act for railway workers. These
possibilities will not be discussed here, both because they
are extremely unlikely to receive serious consideration in
view of the generosity of recoveries under the F.E.L.A.
and the virtual conversion of that act to a no-fault act,
and partly because this paper is designed primarily to deal
with conflicts problems between existing acts, as dis-
tinguished from fundamental alterations in the character
of the acts themselves.
IX. CONCLUSION
This analysis has been addressed to the various
specific points at which conflict laws could be improved,
with some suggestions on the content of measures that
would bring about the desired improvement. No attempt
has been made to open up the inevitable next question,
which is how one would go about getting this kind of
legislation passed. The same problem will recur at every
point where it is concluded that some change in State
workmen's compensation standards or provisions would
be desirable. Presumably, whatever course is recom-
mended as to standards generally, could also be applied to
the standard of proper legislative disposition of the
problem of conflict of laws.
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